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EFFECT OF THE PADLOCK LAW
UPON LANDLORD AND TENANT
BRUNO V. BITKER*
T HE provisions of the Prohibition Act, Section 22, Title II, (U. S.
C. A. Title 27, Section 33) concerning the abatement of a nuis-
ance have been applied to a variety of facts and the law seems well
settled. The fact that the landlord, free of participation in the acts
constituting a nuisance, suffers with the tenant, is no defense to the
nuisance suit. The object of the padlock action is to abate and pre-
vent a nuisance, regardless of by whom committed.'
The effect upon the relationship of landlord and tenant, however,
after the commission of a violation of the Prohibition Act, is not so
clearly settled by cases in point. The problems arise under various
conditions: first, the landlord's rights prior to institution of nuisance
proceedings by the government; second, rights of landlord after the
government has instituted padlock proceedings; and third, rights of
landlord after entry of decree by the Court, padlocking the premises.
I. RIGHT OF LANDLORD PRIOR TO PROCEEDINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT
In cases in which the leases contain provisions against the sale or
possession of intoxicating liquors on the demised premises by the ten-
ant, or similar provisions against the breach of any laws, the rights
of the parties are subject to the terms of the contract. A breach of
this provision would undoubtedly give the landlord the same right to
terminate the lease as he would have upon the breach of any other
provision of the lease. Right to recover rentals due thereafter or any
other damages suffered by reason of the -breach would depend upon
the terms of the contract.
The problem which faces the landlord, however, is his right to declare
a forfeiture against the tenant who violates the Prohibition Act where
the lease is silent upon the particular question or fails to contain a
saving clause against the violation of a Federal law. This omission
is not unusual and most leases which contain prohibitions against law
violations refer only to the ordinary health and sanitation laws or
building restrictions of the municipality or state and omit reference to
Federal statutes. At common law the landlord had no cause of action
* Member of the Milwaukee Bar.
1The latest case before the Supreme Court of the United States decided
April 7, 1928, is Grossfield v. United States, 276 U.S. 494.
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for forfeiture of a lease based upon the illegal use of the premises
by the tenant and no covenant can be implied to create a basis for an
action of forfeiture.2 This is certainly true in Wisconsin where by
statute no covenants may be implied in leases exceeding three years.3
Unless protected under the contract with his tenant, and having no
cause of action at common law, the landlord is apparently helpless in
preventing the possibility of subsequent violations on his own property
by his tenant.
The Prohibition Act, however, has furnished to the landlord a means
of protecting himself. The act provides as follows:
Section 23, Title II, National Prohibition Act, Last Paragraph:
Any violation of this title upon any leased premises by the lessee
or occupant thereof shall, at the option of the lessor, work a forfeiture
of the lease.
The landlord is thus given a statutory right of action under which
he can proceed, regardless of his failure to have protected himself under
the terms of the lease. The failure of the landlord to avail himself
of this protection, assuming his knowledge of the nuisance, may be in-
dicative of his willingness to close his eyes to the true situation and to
assume the risks of action by the Government. But the landlord who
acts speedily upon learning of the nuisance is not likely to be impeded
by the Government in his desire to avail himself of the protection which
the Government has provided for him under just such circumstances.
Since the right thus granted, being in the nature of a Federal statu-
tory cause of action, and assuming the requisite amount of Three Thou-
sand ($3,000) dollars as required by the Judicial Code is involved, the
proper forum to which to apply for relief would seem to be the United
States Courts. The right to institute the proceeding in the United
States Court has been determined by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in an unpublished case, Lincoln
Realty and Investment Company vs. Knuth, decided March II, 1926,
and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
January 5, 1927.
The defendant in that case raised squarely the question of jurisdic-
tion, since both parties were residents of the state of Wisconsin. The
Court held, however, that the relief sought being specifically provided
for by Federal statute, the Federal right appearing on the face of the
complaint, and the requisite amount being present, the Federal Court
had jurisdiction.4
'Pickalo v. Mack, 217 Mich. 274, 186 N.W. 582.
'Goldman v. Dieves, 159 Wis. 47, 149 N.W. 713.
'The general principles applicable to such jurisdictional question are dis-
cussed in: Binderup v. Pathi Exchange, 263 U.S. 291.
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At the same time there seems to be no reason why the statute cannot
be enforced in the courts of those states which recognize the rights of
their own courts of general jurisdiction to apply the laws of the United
States.5
The practical difficulties to the landlord are apparent. He cannot in-
stitute suit under Section 23 without evidence of a violation upon which
to substantiate his complaint. He is thus put upon the duty of ascer-
taining from time to time, as best he can, whether or not his property
is being used by his tenant in violation of the Prohibition Act. When
the fact of violation is brought to his attention, the landlord permits
a continuance of the tenancy thereafter at his own risk.
In the Grossfield case the landlord testified that the only knowledge
he had of the violation was a newspaper report of a raid, that he there-
after remonstrated with his tenant who assured him that the violation
would not be repeated. The government instituted padlock proceedings
two and one half months later. The United States Supreme Court said:
The circumstances called for prompt action and the failure of the
owners of the premises to take any steps to remove the tenants until
after the suit had been brought evinces a lack of concern not easily
reconcilable with a real desire on their part to make sure that the un-
lawful use of their property would not be repeated. 6
The statute and the Court could have notified landlords no more
clearly of the necessity of prompt and speedy action on behalf of the
landlord who desires to protect his property against padlocking, than
by this quoted statement of the Supreme Court.7
The relief sought may be denied the landlord upon the ground of
waiver as in any other case in which the landlord loses the right of for-
feiture by acquiescing in the breach through acceptance of benefits
under the lease after knowledge of the breach. On this very point, the
court, in United States vs. Boynton, 297 Fed. 261, p. 269 declares:
Clearly only a lessor who has not acquiesced in the maintenance of
a nuisance may complain of such nuisance as a ground for forfeiture
of the lease.
And in Wisconsin in a case where the situation was reversed in that
the tenant sought to be relieved from the lease, because of a violation
of the Prohibition Act by a co-tenant, the court says:
Assuming, but not deciding, that a right of forfeiture arose, by .the
continued occupancy of the premises and payment of the rent in accord-
' The particular relief has been granted in Pennsylvania in: Burke v. Bryant,
et al, 128 Atl. 82r, 283 Pa. 191.
'Grossfield v. U. S. 276 U.S. 494.
' See, too, Grossman v. United States 280 Fed. 683 (7th C.C.A.).
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ance with the terms of the lease the International Banking Company
waived its right to declare a forfeiture ..... While we find no case in
point, we see no reason why acts which are held to amount to a waiver
of forfeiture by a landlord do not have the same legal consequences
as do those of the tenant when a forfeiture is claimed by him.'
The Prohibition Act, therefore, has given to the landlord an addi-
tional cause for forfeitures, not granted to him under the common law,
and to which he may not be entitled under the contract with his tenant.9
The right to the relief however, appears no broader than a right of
forfeiture for any breach of the lease which would otherwise warrant
a forfeiture. The same general principles as to acquiescence and wai-
ver appear applicable, particularly since the statute gives to the landlord
an "option," which he can exercise or waive.
II. RIGHTS OF LANDLORD AFTER INSTITUTION OF PADLOCK
PROCEEDINGS BY THE GOVERNMENT
This article is merely an attempt to point out briefly certain questions
effecting landlord and tenant and is not concerned with rights of the
landlord as against the Government in a padlock proceeding. Fre-
quently the landlord is advised for the first time of the acts of nuisance
on his property upon being served with summons in the Government's
suit. In truth the institution of suit by the Government may be only
constructive notice since it is unnecessary to make the owner of the
property a party defendant.'0
The provisions of Section 23, under which the landlord may declare
a forfeiture, are still open to him, however. This may be accomplished
through the filing of a cross-complaint, in which the prayer for relief
begs judgment declaring a forfeiture of the lease against the landlord's
co-defendant. The right to thus cross-complain has been determined
in a number of cases."1
If the landlord has not been made a party to the Government's ac-
tion, he may intervene, and obtain the relief provided in Section 23,
assuming the innocence of the landlord with respect to the violation of
the Prohibition Act.
12
But, as was said in the Boynton case, the landlord who seeks the re-
lief must do so in good faith and must be free of knowledge of or
Cox v. Miller Brewing Co., 192 Wis. 297.
'As to the necessity generally of electing between declaring a forfeiture for
cause and waiving the right by recognizing the continuance of the lease see
Wilson v. Demos, i85 Wis. 42.
"United States v. Marhold, 18 F. 2nd 779.
Denapolis v. Unrited States 3 F. 2nd 722.
" Grossman v. United States, 28o Fed. 683 (7th C.C.A.).
' United States v. Boynton. 287 Fed. 261.
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participation in the acts complained of by the Government. In the
Grossman case and in the Boynton case the Court granted the for-
feiture upon the landlord's request, enjoined the use of the property
against the sale of intoxicating liquors and accepted the landlord's
bond to insure the observance of the injunction. On the other hand,
the nuisance -suit being solely preventative,'13 there appears no reason
why in the final decree the court cannot order a forfeiture of the lease
to an innocent landlord and at the same time a padlocking of the prem-
ises for one year because the likelihood of continuance o-f the nuisance
seems clear.
Thus, in Schleider vs. United States, ii Fed. 2nd 345 (cited with
approval by the United States Supreme Court in the Grossfield case),
the landlord upon being advised of the nuisance, caused the eviction
of the tenant and the premises were in fact closed at the time of the
trial. The Court says (p. 347):
It is the contention of appellants that the property of an innocent
owner cannot be ordered closed after the ejectment of the tenant and
the abatement of the nuisance. There would be much force in this
contention if it were not for the provision allowing the owner to bond
the injunction. This is a reasonable requirement as a guaranty of good
faith, and to insure that the property will not again become a nuis-
ance, for a period sufficient for it to lose its character and reputation
as a place where liquor may be purchased. This provision affords
ample protection to an innocent owner.
The landlord having the right to seek the relief provided for in Sec-
tion 23 for forfeiture of the lease in the same action by which the
Government seeks to padlock the premises, and assuming that under
given circumstances his prayer would be granted, a bond accepted, the
premises restored to him free to be used for any purpose excepting
the unlawful use complained of, he is still confronted with the problem
of determining whether he cares to forfeit the lease and release the ten-
ant from obligations thereunder, or prefers to allow the lease to remain
in full force and affect.
III. LANDLORD'S RIGHTS AFTER ENTRY OF DECREE PADLOCKING
PREMISES
Since the forfeiture of the lease prior to suit by the government or in
the same action with the government's suit does not of itself prevent
padlocking the premises, the landlord's problem with respect to the
lease appears the same before, during, and after the entry of the decree.
If the landlord prevails, the contract is cancelled, the premises may be
restored to him, but his right of action against the tenant for rentals
= Murphy v. United States, 272 U.S. 630.
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thereafter would appear to have been effectively terminated under ordi-
nary circumstances. On the other hand there appears no reason why
the landlord may not waive his right to a forfeiture, permit the lease to
remain in full force and effect, entitling him to the rentals reserved.
Thus, in United States vs. Pepe, 12 F. 2nd 985 (2nd C. C. A.) the
court says:
In the instant case the premises had theretofore been padlocked for
a year. Though the owner had thereupon begun dispossess proceed-
ings, he did not pursue them; on the contrary, he permitted the lease
to remain in force and after the year was up accepted the back rent.
In so doing the owner acted within his legal rights; he was not obligated
to terminate the lease and thereby to jeopardize the collection of the
rent.
The right to thus collect the past rentals, accruing during the period
of the padlock has been passed upon squarely in a recent case."4
Of course, if the lease contains a saving clause whereby the tenant's
liability carries through after eviction, the landlord may declare a for-
feiture and still recover for subsequent sums due.15 Regardless, how-
ever, of whether the landlord declares or waives the forfeiture, his
right to collect rentals during the period of the padlocking would de-
pend upon his non-participation in the illegal acts.
The serious question for consideration in each case, therefore, arises
in determining the fact of participation by the landlord. If the lease
was originally made for the purpose of providing premises upon which
the law could be violated, although not so expressed, the courts will
not enforce the terms of the lease. This is on the general principle
that the courts will not recognize the rights of either party to any
illegal contract.' It would seem to be proper for the tenant in de-
fending the action on the theory of illegality to introduce evidence of
the acts and conduct of the parties before and after making the lease
to permit the court or jury to pass upon the question of whether the
lease, silent as to the illegal use, was in fact entered into for that pur-
pose."
Assuming, however, that the original contract was lawful, the sub-
sequent participation by the landlord in the illegal acts would prevent
the right of recovery, no matter how slight was the participation. 8 On
"Goellet v. National Surety Company (N.Y.), 164 N. E. 112.
'5 A lease containing such a clause is discussed in a recent Wisconsin case.
Selts hwestment Company v. Promotors of Federated Nations. (Wis.) 222
N.W. 812.
l"Koepke v. Peper, 155 Ia. 687, 136 N.W. 902.
'Kessler v. Pearson, 126 Ga. 725.
"Harbison v. Shirly, 139 Ia. 605, i9 L.R.A. (N.S.) 662.
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the other hand, it would seem that mere knowledge of the subsequent
unlawful use although sufficient to constitute a waiver of the right of
forfeiture, does not make the landlord a participant therein. It has
been said: "The lessor is not the keeper of the conscience of the lessee,
and has no police control over him in such matters ..... ".10
In the event of a padlocking of the premises, therefore, where the
original lease was in fact entered into for a lawful purpose, the subse-
quent illegal use, though known to the landlord, does not prevent re-
covery of rentals accruing during the padlock period, if the landlord did
not participate in the prohibited use. While knowledge of the intended
use prior to or at the time of the execution of the lease would taint
the contract, knowledge acquired thereafter does not constitute partici-
pation .20
"Ashford v. Mace, lO3 Ark. 114, 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 11o4.20 Ibid.
